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C / I A 0 S 
The Reason for Structural Causation 
Denn das Selbstgedachte versteht man viel grundlicher, 
als das Erlernte, und erhalt, wenn man es nachmals bei 
jenen Friihern fmdet, unverhofft eine stark fur die Wahr-
heit desselben zeugende Bestatigung, durch fremde, aner-
kannte Auktoritat, wo durch man sodann Zuversicht und 
Standhaftigkeit gewinnt, es gegen jeden Widerspruch zu 
verfechten. 
Arthur Schopenhauer 
"Ueber Philosophie und ihre Methode" 
1 The Problem 
Suppose you have an urn containing fifty white balls and fifty black balls . Y o u 
perform a series of a hundred drawings w i t h replacements, and take down the 
results. A s it happens, there are 52 white balls i n the series and 48 black ones. 
T h i s is a normal result under the circumstances described. 1 In fact, we are 
inc l ined to say that the colour rat io of balls i n the urn in some way explains or 
causes the colour rat io among the balls ac tual ly drawn in our experiment . Were 
we to perform a great number of such drawing experiments of length 100, we 
would f ind that in the vast major i ty of cases, the number of white balls drawn 
is approximate ly the same as the number of black balls. In other words, the 
ra t io of white to black balls remains approximate ly constant in our repeated 
sequences of drawings. Laplace ([19], p. x l v i i i ) called the colour rat io of balls in 
the u rn the constant cause of the colour ra t io among the outcomes. A c c o r d i n g 
to Laplace , it is due to Jakob Bernoul l i ' s theorem (a special case of the weak 
law of large numbers) that the constant cause w i l l i n the long run get the better 
of the so-called variable causes: causes which are effective i n an uncontrol led 
way i n every single drawing, but the effects of which finally "average out" . 
1 We may also say that this is a lucky result which allows for the kind of explanation 
to be discussed in this paper. We might as well end up with a series of 97 white and 
only 3 black balls. It is this realization of the improbable that made Stegmuller ([50], 
pp. 281-285, 313-314; [51]) argue against the very feasibility of statistical explanations. 
See Humphreys ([13], pp. 117-118) for a rejoinder. 
O n the other hand, there is the mechanistic picture of explanat ion . Accor -
ding to this view, an explanat ion consists in a detailed account of how an i n i t i a l 
state of affairs develops and lawfully produces the exp lanandum. In the case at 
hand, the descript ion of the i n i t i a l condit ions consists in a perfect specification 
of the posit ions and momenta of a l l balls, of the form of their surface as well as 
the surface of the urn, and a precise descript ion of the drawing procedure. If we 
had a l l this informat ion, then it could — in principle — be calculated exactly 
which of the balls were bound to be drawn. After adding informat ion about 
the colours of the balls, one gets the colour ratio as a byproduct of the more 
informative explanat ion. T h e explanat ion of the colour rat io is as it were only 
parasit ic on the genuine explanat ion of the actual order of drawings of exactly 
these balls (wi th "internal numbers" 56, 02, 88, 39, . . . , say) . 2 A n advocate of 
this account of explanat ion w i l l say that he does not understand what justifies 
us to endow the statement of so-called constant causes wi th the honourable 
te rm 'explanat ion ' . In fact, Laplace himself should have fallen v i c t i m to this 
argument. His own creature, the famous demon, w i l l challenge his doctrince of 
constant causes. Be ing i n an ideal epistemic s i tua t ion , 3 the omniscient in te l l i -
gence s imply wou ld not understand the recourse to constant causes. He does 
not need them, he has no place for t h e m . 4 
Is, then, Laplace in the s i tua t ion of the proverbial sorcerer's apprentice who 
does not come to terms w i t h the demon he has conjured up? It is the a i m of 
this paper to help Laplace convince the demon that his — Laplace 's — doctr ine 
makes sense after a l l and can i n fact be reconciled w i t h the demon's mechanist ic 
account of the wor ld . 
T h i s latter account is thoroughly deterministic. It is of crucial importance , 
however, not to m i x up two different senses of 'de te rminism' . W e shal l use the 
te rm to denote the thesis that whatever happens i n the wor ld is determined by 
antecedent conditions; that there are no irreducible chance phenomena which 
cannot be explained away by a consideration of add i t iona l (sometimes hidden) 
causal factors. 5 We do not use the te rm 'de te rminism' to signify the thesis that 
2 Against a suggestion of Max Urchs, I am inclined to group the following condition as a 
paradigmatic non-theorem rather than a paradigmatic theorem of the logic of causation 
or explanation: If A causes/explains B and B logically entails C, then A causes/explains 
C. Parasitic explanations are no genuine explanations. 
3 Naively, this is just the situation we attempt to reach in the course of the scienctific 
enterprise; but cf. footnote 2. 
4 W.V.O. Quine ([41], §§ 46-47) appears to be a disciple of the Laplacian intelligence when 
he insinuates that dispositions and causal statements are to be reduced to the existence of 
certain "connecting" or "definite mechanisms'' ([41], pp. 223, 225). In [42], quite the same 
explanatory role is played by the notion of natural kind, or — what "varies together" 
(p. 121) with the notion of kind — the notion of similarity. He holds, however, that "we 
can take it as a very special mark of the maturity of a branch of science that it no longer 
needs an irreducible notion of similarity and kind." (p. 138) 
everything is predictable by human scientists. 6 
W e know that there are fundamental l imi t s to our capacities of determi-
n ing exact ly the antecedent condit ions, as well as to our capacities of solving 
complex equation systems. Hence there are fundamental l imi t s to our capaci-
ties of predic t ing future events. It is mis leading to identify de terminism w i t h 
predic tabi l i ty- in-pr inc ip le , as long as it is not pointed out that what is meant is 
p red ic tab i l i ty for the Laplacian demon rather than predic tab i l i ty for humans. 
In the fol lowing we shal l assume, for the sake of argument, that the wor ld is de-
terminis t ic , even i f that does not match the current state of scientific theorizing. 
T h e reason for this assumption is, first, that we would be happy to get clear 
about the (supposedly) simpler case of a determinist ic wor ld , and, secondly, 
that i t is the L a p l a c i a n demon w h o m we are going to argue w i t h anyway. 
W h y is this an interesting problem? I have two answers. F i r s t and foremost, 
the problems w i t h the urn model are symptomat i c of a problem concerning 
explana t ion i n the social sciences. There s ta t is t ical tables are supposed to be 
of explanatory value. T h e y exhibi t the same k i n d of constancy as repeated 
experiments w i t h sequences of drawings. Numbers which are constant over a 
substant ia l t ime interval are taken to be caused by something — by some "con-
stant causes." M o r e specifically, the para l le l may be drawn along the fol lowing 
lines: 
• Due to the colour rat io of the balls in the urn , we may say that each i n d i v i d u a l 
drawing has a propensity of 0.5 of showing a black ba l l . Chang ing the rat io 
i n the urn w i l l result i n a lowering or increasing of this propensity of each 
i n d i v i d u a l drawing. T h o u g h this does not give an account of the i n d i v i d u a l 
"kinetic histories" of actual drawings of black balls, we may s t i l l assume 
that in our determinist ic but "chaotic" urn model the i n i t i a l condit ions are 
dis t r ibuted in such a way that in a corresponding propor t ion of cases, black 
drawings w i l l be prevented or promoted . 
• Due to the social and legislative condit ions in a society, each i n d i v i d u a l has 
a propensity of 0.0027 of commi t t i ng a certain crime in Ge rmany in 1993, 
say. Chang ing the social boundary condit ions w i l l result i n a lowering or 
increasing of this propensity of each i n d i v i d u a l . T h o u g h this does not give 
an account of the i nd iv idua l "mora l histories" of actual crimes, we may s t i l l 
5 This is roughly what Anscombe ([1], p. 63) calls the assumption of relevant differences: 
"Kan effect occurs in one case and a similar effect does not occur in an apparently similar 
case, there must be a relevant further difference." 
6 Even if they are equipped with the best measuring devices and computers one can think 
of. This kind of explication of determinism is aimed at by Popper ([38], pp. 1-2): "what 
I call 'scientific' determinism the doctrine that the structure of the world is such 
that any event can be rationally predicted, with, any desired degree of precision, if we 
are given a sufficiently precise description of past events, together with all the laws of 
nature." (Popper's italics) 
assume that i n our determinist ic but chaotic wor ld the i n i t i a l condit ions are 
dis t r ibuted in such a way that in a corresponding propor t ion of cases, crimes 
w i l l be prevented or promoted. 
A common cause philosophy was advocated in the social sciences by the 
Belg ian s ta t is t ic ian Ado lphe Quetelet in the 1830s and '40s. 7 A s W e y m a Li ibbe 
([23]) points out, both in the urn example and in social statistics, we assume 
that the i n d i v i d u a l events (drawings and crimes) are independent of each other, 
and yet the collective results show a surpris ing constancy. T h i s has led to the 
pos tu la t ion of a constant cause for the constant macroscopic effects. W h i l e it is 
pretty clear what is the na tura l candidate for being the constant cause in the 
urn model — v iz . , the colour rat io amongst the balls in the urn — we are at a 
loss what to say in the case of the social sciences. T h e ma in problem i n contrast 
to the urn model is that i t is at least doubtful whether we can legi t imately 
st ipulate the existence of such a th ing as a "constant cause" of the crime rate 
in G e r m a n y in 1993. T h i s is not the only problem w i t h the paral le l between 
urn experiments and the tables of social statistics. It must be admi t ted that 
considerable work needs to be done in order to reveal that the analogy is indeed 
instructive. 
M y second reason for addressing urn experiments in this paper is s impler . 
There is enough discussion in the l i terature that warrants a new at tempt at 
clar i fying the concept of causali ty i n urn models. In his paper on "The Slow Rise 
of P r o b a b i l i s m " , Lorenz Kr i ige r identifies a lack of discernment of the differences 
between the two above-mentioned accounts of causation or explanat ion dur ing 
the greater part of the 19th century. 8 
T h e purpose of the present paper is an at tempt to reconcile two very different 
approaches to the concept of causation. In the or ig ina l form, it is the opposi-
t ion found in Laplace between his doctr ine of constant and variable causes on 
the one hand 9 and his mechanistic determinism on the o ther . 1 0 T h e tension 
between the two was formulated in a l l clar i ty only by M a x w e l l who repeatedly 
stressed the contrast between the statistical and the dynamical me thod (which 
latter he also called the historical or strictly kinetic method) . T h i s problem 
has again been brought to the fore and identified as a reason for the slow rise 
of de terminism by Kr i ige r who used the terms structural and dynamical causes 
7 See e.g. Quetelet ([40], Vol. I, pp. 3-16). 
8 Like Kriiger and pace Stegmuller ([52], pp. 9, 633-634), I shall not distinguish between 
the problem of causation and the problem of explanation. Causation and explanation are 
closely tied in the work of Wesley Salmon. 
9 This doctrine of Laplace's is no well-defined theory. It is given in the section "Des lois de la 
Probability qui resultent de la multiplication indefmie des evenements." ([19], pp. xlvii-
lv) He does not even address the question of what "causes regulieres et constantes" 
(p. xlviii) are. Presumably they are causes which are supposed to be constantly effective 
over a substantial period of time. 
for the d is t inc t ion i n quest ion. 1 1 In the recent A m e r i c a n discussion, , a s imi lar 
d ichotomy surfaces in the work of Wesley Sa lmon ([46], p. 99) who distinguishes 
statistical f rom aleatory12 causation. A t any rate, we have prima facie con-
f l ic t ing in tui t ions about causality and exp l ana t i on . 1 3 I shal l argue that as far 
as games of chance are concerned, to assign probabi l is t ic laws a fundamental 
role i n scientific explanat ion does not conflict w i t h the assumption of Lap lac i an 
de te rminism. M y vague hope is that in the long run a proper understanding 
of games of chance w i l l also shed some l ight on the role of probabi l is t ic laws as 
employed in the social sciences. 
I s tarted to th ink about s t ructural causation and the re la t ion between deter-
m i n i s m and p robab i l i sm in response to the s t imula t ing paper of Lorenz Kr i ige r 
and the equally s t imula t ing discussions w i t h my colleague W e y m a L i i b b e . I 
thought that some basic insights of modern chaos theory should be invoked 
i n order to overcome a purely subjective view of probabi l i ty and convince the 
Lap l ac i an intelligence that it does make sense to use probabi l i s t ic patterns i n 
causal explanat ions. O n l y then d id I discover that basical ly the same idea had 
been put to good use by Henr i Poincare as early as 1896. 1 4 He pushed the idea 
much further by offering a mathemat ica l theorem on which phi losophical i n -
terpretations can tu rn . For some reason, Poincare 's cont r ibut ion tends to be 
neglected i n the current l i terature on probabi l i s t ic causality. One notable ex-
ception is J a n von P l a t o ([31] - [34]) who i n a series of excellent papers traces 
the fate of Poincare 's method of arbitrary functions up to the modern theory of 
ergodic systems. I have benefitted a great deal from his work. 
2 Four Concepts of Causation 
We now present a very rough scheme of four different concepts of causation to 
which we w i l l refer i n our subsequent discussion. 
1. Causation of the Laplacian intelligence: Covering law, deductive-nomolo-
10 Which found its immortal expression in the metaphor of Laplace's ([19], pp. vi-vii) demon: 
"Nous devons done envisager l'etat present de I'univers comme 1'efTet de son etat anterieur 
et comme la cause de celui qui va suivre. Une intelligence qui, pour uii instant doime, 
connaitrait toutes les forces dont la nature est animee et la situation respective des etres 
qui la composent, si d'ailleurs elle etait assez vaste pour soumettre ces donnees a 1'Analyse, 
embrasserait dans la meme formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de I'univers et 
ceux du plus leger atome: rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l'avenir, comme le passe, 
serait present a ses yeux." 
11 "The ratio of the two effects 'white ball drawn' and 'black ball drawn', however, cannot 
be attributed to any dynamical cause operative in the process. The constant "cause" 
that brings about this ratio is, of course, the ratio of white to black balls in the urn. This 
is clearly a real condition of the dynamical process . . . , but we may call it a "structural" 
condition, since it is not a dynamical part of the history of the system." ([18], p. 65) 
gical, deterministic causation. Consider a complete descript ion of the state 
of the wor ld at a given t ime, take a l l laws of nature and derive from these 
two components the state of the wor ld at any other t ime, again described in 
full completeness. It makes sense to st ipulate that a cause must t empora l ly 
precede its effects; moreover, an element of the description of the " i n i t i a l state" 
qualifies as a ("determining") cause for an effect under consideration only if it 
ac tual ly enters into the derivat ion of the effect. We have no occasion to consider 
counterfactual si tuations. 
2. Laplacian causation: The doctrine of constant and variable causes. In order 
to ascertain whether something (a "factor") is a cause of the effect under dis-
cussion, one has to consider a l l / a large number o f / a select set of si tuations in 
which this factor is constantly present, but in which a l l other factors are changed 
a r b i t r a r i l y / w i t h sufficient va r i ab i l i ty / accord ing to certain cr i ter ia of choice. If 
the effect is obtained uniformly or w i t h sufficient frequency and approx imat ion , 
then the factor under consideration is i n fact to be regarded as a ( "constant") 
cause. Here we compare a real s i tua t ion w i t h — actual or counterfactual — 
situations where everything except the putative cause is varied. 
(In numerous special cases the constant causes of Laplace may be identified 
w i t h the statistical or structural causes already mentioned.) 
S. Counterfactual causation, forward direction: sine qua non causation. In 
order to ascertain whether something (a "factor") is a cause of the effect under 
discussion, one has to consider a l l / a large number o f / a select set of s i tuat ions 
in which a l l other factors are constantly present, but in which this factor is 
changed a r b i t r a r i l y / w i t h sufficient va r i ab i l i ty / accord ing to certain cr i ter ia of 
choice. If the effect is lost uni formly or w i t h sufficient frequency as a result 
of the change i n the putat ive causes, then the factor under consideration is 
in fact to be regarded as a ("counterfactual") cause. Here we compare a real 
s i tuat ion w i t h — actual or counterfactual — situations where everything except 
the putative cause is kept fixed. 
4. Counterfactual causation, backward direction: Why ask, "Why?"? (Sa lmon 
[45], Humphreys [13]) Why-quest ions arise when we are surprised by an effect, 
12 T h i s term is due to Humphreys . 
13 I shall not pursue here the interesting question whether the two types of causation are 
i n some essential way related to the distinction between a discrete and a continuous 
conceptualization of the world. — For more conflicting intuitions, see Stegmuller ([50], 
p p . 311-317), Suppes ([53]) and S p o h n ([48]). 
14 
It must be pointed out that Poincare was no isolated figure. T h e gist of his argument can 
be found i n remarkable detail already in von Kries ([17], Chapter III, Section 2), and a 
philosophically more penetrating assessment of the problem is provided in the beautiful 
paper of von Smoluchowski ([47]). 
when we have been expecting, at least w i t h considerable probabi l i ty , a diffe-
rent course of events. In order to ascertain whether something (a "factor") is a 
cause of the effect under discussion, one has to consider a l l / a large number o f / a 
select set of si tuations in which the effect is changed a r b i t r a r i l y / w i t h sufficient 
va r i ab i l i t y / acco rd ing to certain cr i ter ia of choice. If the factor under conside-
ra t ion must have been absent uniformly or w i t h sufficient frequency i n order 
to acccomodate the change i n the effects, then i t is in fact to be regarded as a 
("counterfactual") cause. Here we compare a real s i tuat ion wi th — actual or 
counterfactual — situations where everything except the putative effect is kept 
fixed.15 
(End of list) 
Some readers w i l l miss a reference to the posi t ive relevance theories as discussed 
i n contemporary approaches to "probabi l is t ic causality." In fact there w i l l be 
none. I have found that the recent discussions i n this area are more or less 
irrelevant to the topics treated in the present paper. The account defended below 
is more l ike a "causal theory of p robab i l i ty" ([29], p. 59) than a "probabil is t ic 
theory of causat ion". 
There is a very strong in tu i t ion that the "demonic" account of causation is 
the best one. T h e Lap lac i an demon is i n an ideal epistemic s i tua t ion which we 
can only envy . 1 6 W h a t more could one ask from an explanat ion than the k i n d 
of informat ion given by the omniscient demon? 
P r i m a facie, constant causes are very suspect entities for the analyt ic ph i -
losopher. He or she would be afraid of i l leg i t imate ly hypos ta t iz ing something 
which does not "really exist", or does not have any systematic or scientific s i -
gnificance. B u t s t i l l i t is in tu i t ive ly very compel l ing to th ink that there must 
be a cause (or perhaps: a reason) for the regularities i n observed ratios. After 
a l l , this inference f rom regularities i n observed frequencies to under ly ing causal 
processes is a central mot ive for embracing the stat is t ical method . 
However, I shal l not advocate one par t icular concept of causation against 
another one as the true concept. A c t u a l l y I th ink that this would at least i n part 
be a quarrel about terminological questions devoid of any genuine phi losophical 
interest. Rather , i t w i l l emerge i n the course of our argument that counterfactual 
causation can help us on our way from Lap l ac i an causation to the concept of 
causation which fits the Lap lac ian demon. In this way we hope to be able to 
15 In the analysis of conditional and causal connectives, the the contrast between the forward 
and the backward directions may be traced back to papers of Nelson Goodman ([10]) and 
Gilbert Ryle ([44]). It is discussed in Rott ([43]) where it is argued that the backward 
direction is preferable. A similar conclusion is reached by McCall ([28], p. 315). Also 
compare Gardenfors ([8], Chapters 8-9) where the anlysis of causality employs a con-
traction with respect to causes, while explanations involve a contraction with respect to 
effects. 
help Laplace out of the predicament of the sorcerer's apprentice who cannot 
take a firm hold of the ghost he has conjured up. 
3 How to Convince the Laplacian Intelligence of the 
Existence of Structural Causes 
Counterfactual Reasoning 
We ask about a cause or about an explanat ion of an event when we d i d not 
expect i t to take place. T h i s is not the same as to say that we expected that the 
exp lanandum event would not happen. We merely th ink that things might have 
turned out otherwise, that is, that the exp lanandum event was not necessary. 
If something has been necessary a l l the t ime, we do not ask for its cause . 1 7 
T h i s line of reasoning should be plausible even for the Lap lac ian intell igence. 
True, in the first instance the demon does not par t icu la r ly concern i tself about 
alternative worlds or al ternative developments of our real wor ld . B u t granted 
the above-mentioned pragmat ic presupposit ion of our search for causes, the 
intelligence can of course satisfy our curiosity. If you ask, " W h y d id this mix tu re 
of chemical substances explode?" you indicate that you rather expected the 
whole th ing to remain in a stable condi t ion . T h e Lap l ac i an intelligence can te l l 
you what sort of in i t i a l condit ions would have to be given, i f the mix tu re were 
to remain stable. 
For the Lap lac ian intelligence, counterfactual reasoning i n the backward d i -
rect ion is not essentially different f rom counterfactual reasoning in the forward 
direct ion. Remember that by hypothesis, it is capable of perfect determinis t ic 
predict ion as well as perfect determinis t ic re t rodic t ion. T h i s applies to i n i t i a l 
condit ions given in the m a x i m a l specific description of a microstate as wel l as to 
i n i t i a l condit ions given in the form of macrostates. In the first case, the demon 
has to compute only one trajectory, in the second case, i t has to perform the 
computa t ion of a whole — and in general, a very large — set of trajectories. 
T h i s is still Maxwell's ([27], p. 439) opinion. B u t there are differing views. P o p p e r ([38], 
§§ 10-11) gives the demon a rather h u m a n face and thus misrepresents, I think, Laplace's 
intentions. Similarly, Prigogine a n d Stengers ([39], p. 271) mainta in that "[w]hen faced 
with . . . unstable systems, Laplace's demon is just as powerless as we". S a l m o n ([45], 
p. 701) holds that the L a p l a c i a n intelligence may lack "knowledge of the mechanisms of 
product ion a n d propagation of structure in the world", and S p o h n ([49], p. 186) contends 
that it lacks an "inductive scheme" and hence "would not know what to believe, if it 
were to discover that it is wrong". W h i l e Popper a n d Prigogine and Stengers doubt the 
demon's predictive competence, Sa lmon a n d Spohn deny that the intelligence's predictive 
competence suffices for its explanatory competence. 
17 So far we are i n perfect agreement with K a n t [15]. 
A s the backward and forward directions of counterfactual reasoning are per-
fectly symmet r ic for the Lap lac ian intelligence, we may not only ask " W h a t 
wou ld have been different, i f the actual effect had not shown up?" We may as 
well ask the converse question " W h a t would have been different, i f the actual 
i n i t i a l condit ions had been sl ightly different?" For the Lap lac i an intelligence, 
these questions are not fundamental ly different. For finite creatures, however, 
who l ike us assume that the causal direct ion follows the arrow of t ime, it seems 
more na tu ra l to pose the second question. We could have changed the effect 
by m an ip u l a t i ng the cause, but not vice versa. T h i s action-oriented in tu i t ion of 
cont ro l may be regarded as a good reason for preferring counterfactual reasoning 
i n the forward direct ion than in the backward d i r ec t ion . 1 8 
T h e essential idea to be applied in our u rn model , however, is neutral w i th 
respect to the tempora l direct ion of counterfactual reasoning. F i x any set of 
i n i t i a l condit ions. For the Lap lac ian intelligence, the whole sequence of drawings 
(or, for that matter , a sequence of sequences of drawings) is just a t iny part of 
the course of the whole determinist ic wor ld . So everything, inc lud ing the acts of 
d rawing , is settled f rom the s ta r t . 1 9 T h e n , of course, the Lap lac ian intelligence 
can predict the results of our sequence (of sequences) of drawings. Clear ly , we 
can say "If these-or-those in i t i a l condit ions had obtained, the result would have 
been such-and-such." T h e problem is which i n i t i a l conditions to consider i n this 
determinis t ic thought experiment. 
W e y m a L i ibbe ([23]) considers variat ions of the colour rat io of the balls 
in the u rn i n order to find out about its causal relevance. I do not th ink, 
however, that this is a very na tura l line of reasoning, or in the spir i t of the 
L a p l a c i a n intelligence. A s I said above, the colour rat io in our series of drawings 
is expla ined only i n a parasit ic manner, v i z . , by first expla in ing the fact that 
these very balls were drawn and then looking at the colour of the balls . T h e 
colours do not figure i n the calcula t ion of the intelligence, so they are no genuine 
causes for i t . In our in tui t ive deliberations, too, we are not going to vary some 
special candidate cause (like the colour rat io) , but we vary something. We 
produce as slight deviations from the actual i n i t i a l conditions as possible. We 
counterfactually shift ba l l N o 38 ha l f a mi l l imeter to the right, give N o 82 a 
l i t t le push, remove a t iny unevenness i n the urn's wal l , or perhaps we exchange 
the posi t ions of balls N o 97 and N o 98. T h e full descript ion of the wor ld , as far 
18 Contra Ryle, McCall and Rott. — Why do people on trains prefer seats facing the engine? 
19 The idea of interpreting repeated experiments as a part of one large experiment has also 
been used by von Plato ([31], p. 65, [33], p. 45) in his attempt to reconcile the initial-
probability account (focusing on abstract "ensembles") with the time-average account 
suggested by ergodic theory. Von Plato claims that "objective" distributions of initial 
conditions can be derived with the help of the new physico-mathematical theories of 
ergodicity. If this were true, the explication of chance would stay completely in the realm 
of the objective. 
as it enters into the demon's calculat ions, should be counted as the cause of the 
effect. Every conceivable devia t ion f rom the in i t i a l state should be taken into 
consideration. Slight deviations should receive more serious consideration than 
drastic and phantast ic ones. Var i a ton of the colour rat io w i l l not be the obvious 
i d e a . 2 0 
M y intui t ions , though not par t icu la r ly f i rm, suggest that counterfactual re-
asoning in our case does not accord well w i t h the s imple schemes prepared i n 
the previous section. It seems to me that we reflect on hypothet ica l changes of 
any arbitrary kind relat ing to the " in i t i a l t ime" when the expla in ing event is 
suppposed to have occurred. We do not consider changes wi th a special view 
to some preconceived candidate cause, but widespread probabi l i ty dis t r ibut ions 
over a great variety of possible deviations from the actual course of events. 
Subjectivity 
N o E q u a l i t y 
We want to know the probabil i t ies for the outcomes of our drawings. T o compute 
them, we need to supply the Lap lac i an intelligence w i t h a prior d i s t r ibu t ion for 
i n i t i a l states. O n the basis of this informat ion, and only on the basis of this 
informat ion, can a l l subsequent determinist ic calculat ions be based. 
T h e first and most obvious idea is to say that a l l possible i n i t i a l states should 
be assigned an equal probabi l i ty . T h i s is the answer Laplace would have given. 
B u t unfortunately, the answer is not well-defined. A s already pointed out by 
von Kr ies ([17], Chapter I, Section 4), i t is not clear, even when we are dealing 
w i t h finite spaces of possibi l i ty, which elements to count as equiprobable. T h e 
problem raises its head w i t h much more severity when infinite poss ibi l i ty spaces 
are to be considered. T h i s is borne out by the famous paradox of Ber t r and . In 
his influential Calcul des Probabilites of 1899, he showed that there are three 
equally plausible ways of es t imat ing the probabl i ty that the length of a chord i n 
a circle is greater than the length of the sides of an inscribed equilateral tr iangle 
— but that the three methods y ie ld three different p robabi l i ty values. 
Now, pure geometry has certainly never been the indended domain of app l i -
cat ion of probabi l i ty theory, and in pract ica l problems of a s imi lar structure we 
may expect hints from the empi r ica l ly given Versuchsanordnung what the right 
formal representation of equipossibi l i ty w i l l be. B u t the problem nevertheless 
20 What would have been the result of changing the colour ratio in the urn of our intro-
ductory example by substituting a few white balls for black ones (or vice versa)? It may 
well be that we finally happen to come up with exactly the same colour ratio, 52:48, in 
our resulting sequence of drawings — although the a priori probability of doing so has 
increased or decreased. Is, then, the colour ratio in the urn a cause for the colour ratio 
in that particular sequence? 
remains acute. W h a t is the just i f icat ion for counting certain i n i t i a l condit ions 
as more or less probable? I take it that Ber t rand made clear once and for a l l 
that there is no absolute sense of equiprobabi l i ty (equipossibi l i ty) , no objective 
foothold for deciding which frame of reference to use for the fixation of equipro-
babi l i ty . It is not at a l l obvious how to choose the d is t r ibu t ion over the in i t i a l 
states. It seems, therefore, that the problem necessarily involves subjective or 
conventionalist (Poincare) elements. 
S i m i l a r i t y 
T h i s is not as bad as it may appear. In considerations of causality, we do not 
entertain the assumpt ion that the world might have been totally different from 
what i t is l ike actual ly. We do not reckon w i t h dramat ic deviations from the 
ac tua l state of affairs, or w i th markedly "exotic" i n i t i a l condit ions. In our urn 
example we do not consider i t a serious poss ibi l i ty that the urn's opening is 
closed, that someone reshapes the balls into cubes, that there are only three i n -
stead of 100 balls i n the urn , that the balls are green and red rather than black 
and whi te , that some hidden magnetic contrivance has been insta l led in order 
to introduce a bias, etc. W e just th ink that things might have been somewhat 
different. T h a t is, i n most cases ( though perhaps less characterist ical ly i n ga-
mes of chance) we are inc l ined to weigh i n i t i a l condit ions according to how close 
they come to the actual i n i t i a l condit ions, or to some standard of "normal i ty" . 
W h e n look ing for causes, we t ry to let intact a large number of ceteris paribus 
condit ions which only make the causes effective at a l l . In the set of a l l concei-
vable i n i t i a l condit ions, singulari t ies i n physica l state spaces w i l l be a t t r ibuted 
a p robabi l i ty measure zero. 
In causal reasoning, then, we invoke a not ion of s imi la r i ty i n the style of 
D a v i d Lewis ([21], [22]). There are three points on which our suggestion dif-
fers f rom Lewis , however. F i r s t , Lewis 's s imi la r i ty takes the form of a ternary 
relat ion of comparat ive s imi la r i ty between "worlds" or states. It is only the 
worlds which are closest to the actual one that matter in Lewis ' s semantics, 
a l l the other worlds do not have any relevance. T h i s a l l -or-nothing pr inciple 
for count ing worlds alias states seems too restrictive. We would rather l ike to 
at t r ibute different weights to different states, so as to make more remote possi-
bil i t ies count less than close possibil i t ies, but s t i l l have some non-zero influence. 
W e propose to measure the relevance of states w i th the help of a smooth pro-
babi l i ty d i s t r ibu t ion over the set of a l l possible i n i t i a l states. Second, i t seems 
that distance from the actual wor ld is not the only th ing that matters. If the 
real wor ld happens to exhibi t exotic features in some special s i tua t ion , then we 
are incl ined to give more weight to the possibi l i ty that things might have been 
more ordinary than to the possibi l i ty that things might have been s t i l l more 
exotic. W h a t counts, then, is some compound of closeness to the actual wor ld 
and closeness to a s tandard of no rma l i t y . 2 1 T h i r d , I do not see any objective 
basis for s imilar i t ies between possible worlds, or even possible courses of the 
actual wor ld . S imi la r i ty is always similari ty-in-a-certain-respect , and there is a 
huge number of possible respects to pay at tention to, but there is no universal 
rule how to combine s imilar i t ies and dissimilari t ies i n different respects into a 
plausible overal l s imi lar i ty . It seems obvious, then, that s imi la r i ty is a hope-
lessly subjective not ion. B u t to say this is to aggravate the problem that has 
already been l ingering since our discussion of Ber t rand 's paradox. W e cannot 
hope to convince the Lap l ac i an intelligence of our own subjective standards of 
s imi la r i ty and normali ty . T h i s would definitely overstrain its readiness to en-
gage in anthropomorphic patterns of reasoning. We somehow have to transcend 
the rea lm of the purely subjective. 
Ass ign ing weights to i n i t i a l condit ions in the form of probabi l i t ies (density 
functions) might tempt one to th ink that we are dealing here wi th a form of 
uncertainty. Indeed the p rob lem of uncertainty is stressed in much of the rele-
vant l i terature. B u t it is essential to understand that it is not our concern here 
that we are never able to measure the actual i n i t i a l condit ions w i t h absolute 
precision. True as this is, i t is not at a l l what we are interested i n . W e do not 
even a i m at a precise determinat ion of the empir ica l data . In the counterfactual 
deliberations involved in causal reasoning, we are going to vary the i n i t i a l condi-
tions anyway — and we do so i n accordance w i t h some i r remediably subjective 
standards of s imi la r i ty and normal i ty . 
Objectivity Regained 
Consider a single draw of a ba l l f rom the urn. Assume that the i n i t i a l condit ions 
are fixed but unknown. T h e L a p l a c i a n intelligence can specify the region in the 
state space of i n i t i a l condit ions which leads to the result that ba l l N o 01 is 
drawn; the region that leads to the drawing of ba l l N o 02; the region that leads 
to the drawing of ba l l N o 03; etc. etc. C a l l the set of a l l points in the state space 
of a "chance-producing" determinis t ic system which are bound to produce one 
and the same effect (e.g., " N o 01 is drawn") an equivalence region. M y c l a im 
now is that the equivalence regions form fractal structures i n the space of a l l 
possible i n i t i a l condit ions. B y approaching the actual i n i t i a l state (according 
to some s tandard of closeness) we do not in the same way approach the actual 
result of the drawing. We cannot resolve the extremely involved structure of 
the equivalence regions by using a huge magnifying glass. T h e complexi ty of 
the regions repeats itself at a l l scales of magnif icat ion. T h i s is a speculat ion so 
far, but i t should present only technical problems to establish the point rather 
more rigorously. 
21 For a discussion of these two kinds of closeness, viewed as two out of five "faces of 
minimahty", see [25]. 
T h e essential part of the argument consists of the following idea: 
For any (subjective) standard of closeness and for every initial state close 
to the actual one, there is a huge number of initial states still closer 
to the actual one which lead to entirely different results (i.e., different 
from the actual result, different from the result effected by the initial state 
mentioned first, and different from each other). 
T h e extreme sensi t ivi ty of the results to minute variat ions of the in i t i a l 
condi t ions has a double effect: T h e equivalence regions are, first, in t r ins ica l ly 
complex and, second, of quite the same s ize . 2 2 Thus we arrive at the fol lowing 
t ransformat ion of the above idea: 
Any probability distribution over initial states mirroring our subjective 
standards of closeness and normality passes smoothly over the equiva-
lence regions which are of bizarre shape but of equal size. Because these 
regions form an extremely — even infinitely — complex, criss-crossing fi-
ligree, every such probability distribution will in the end lead to the same 
probability distribution over the space of possible effects. 
T h i s is an invariance argument. O n the basis of what seems to be an i n -
nocent mathemat ica l assumption — the assumpt ion of a k i n d of smoothness 
of the i n i t i a l d i s t r ibu t ion — it becomes evident that the final d i s t r ibu t ion w i l l 
correspond exactly to the respective numbers of balls i n the urn . T h i s can be 
a t t r ibuted to objective, non-probabi l is t ic features of the chance set-up. W e have 
fifty white balls and fifty black balls , and we assume that there is no bu i l t - i n 
mechanism producing any bias. For every i n i t i a l probabi l i ty d i s t r ibu t ion mi r ro-
r ing our subjective standards of closeness, then, each bal l ' s p robabi l i ty of being 
drawn in a single drawing w i l l be 1:100. T h e probabi l i ty that a white b a l l is 
drawn in a single drawing w i l l be 50:100, and so on. 
T h e objec t iv iza t ion of the final probabi l i t ies of our drawings is due to the 
fact that a l l kinds of well-behaved subjective dis t r ibut ions over i n i t i a l condit ions 
lead — after sufficient m i x i n g — to the same resultant d i s t r ibu t ion . T h i s again 
is due to the chaotic behaviour of the system. W h a t we get in the end are single-
case p robab i l i t i e s 2 3 which are objective in the sense of being intersubjective but 
not i n the sense that they are due to i r reducibly indeterminis t ic processes. 
4 Maxwell and Poincare: Some Historical Remarks 
A s pointed out by Kr i ige r ([18]), James C le rk M a x w e l l was perhaps the first to 
perceive very clearly that the na tura l sciences i n the middle of the 19th century 
22 Cf. von Smoluchowski's ([47], p. 87) somewhat technical definition of what it means that 
a "causal relation" y = f(x) has "'oscillating' character". 
23 Von Smoluchowski ([47], p. 85) uses the term "Wahrscheirdichkeit schlechthin" ("proba-
bility as such"). 
were about to apply two methods which were, on the face of i t , fundamental ly 
different. We quote this at ful l length: 
The modern atomists have therefore adopted a method which is, I believe, new 
in the department of mathematical physics, though it has long been in use in 
the section of Statistics. When the working members of Section F get hold 
of a report of the Census, or any other document containing the numerical 
data of Economic and Social Science, they begin by distributing the whole 
population into groups, according to age, income-tax, education, religious belief, 
or criminal convictions. The number of individuals is far too great to allow of 
their tracing the history of each separately, so that, in order to reduce their 
labour within human limits, they concentrate their attention on a small number 
of artificial groups. The varying number of individuals in each group, and not 
the varying state of each individual, is the primary datum from which they 
work. This, of course, is not the only method of studying human nature. We 
may observe the conduct of individual men and compare it with that conduct 
which their previous character and their present circumstances, according to 
the best existing theory, would lead us to expect. Those who practise this 
method endeavour to improve their knowledge of the elements of human nature 
in much the same way as an astronomer corrects the elements of a planet by 
comparing its actual position with that deduced from the received elements. 
The study of human nature by parents and schoolmasters, by historians and 
statesmen, is therefore to be distinguished from that carried on by registrars 
and tabulators, and by those statesmen who put their faith in figures. The 
one may be called the historical, and the other the statistical method. ([26], 
pp. 373-374) 
In an unpubl ished paper of the same year, M a x w e l l ([27], p . 438) elaborates 
on the d is t inc t ion of the two methods, now called "two kinds of knowledge, 
. . . the D y n a m i c a l and the S ta t i s t i ca l" 2 4 
W h a t is interesting is that M a x w e l l establishes a connection w i t h the d i -
s t inct ion between "his tor ical" and "prophet ical" inquiry , and wi th the contrast 
between stable and unstable systems. He calls a system unstable "when an i n -
finitely sma l l variat ion in the present state may br ing about a finite difference 
in the state of the system i n a finite t ime" ([27], p. 440); otherwise it is called 
stable. In a l l pract ical appl icat ions of physics, the metaphysical axiom "that 
f rom the same antecedents follow the same consequents" has to be replaced by 
the physical axiom "[t]hat f rom like antecedents follow like consequents". S i m i -
lar dist inct ions were to be drawn in the 20th century under the names " ' w e a k ' 
determinacy" vs. " ' s t rong ' determinacy" by B o r n ([3], p. 80), "metaphysica l 
de terminism" vs. " 'scient if ic ' de terminism" by Popper ([38], § 1), and "weak 
24 The distinction has been a subject of lively discussion ever since. See for instance Planck 
([30]) and Levi-Strauss ([20], 528-531). 
pr incip le of causal i ty" vs. "strong pr incip le of causali ty" by Deker and T h o m a s 
([5]). 2 5 T h e central role of the strong axioms i n everyday reasoning as well as 
science has often been stressed, for example by Quine: 
Every reasonable expectation depends on resemblance of circumstances, to-
gether with our tendency to expect similar causes to have similar effects. ([42], 
p. 117) 
and by Gle ick : 
Scientists marching under Newton's banner actually waved another flag that 
said something like this: Given an approximate knowledge of a system's init ial 
conditions and an understanding of natural law, one can calculate the approxi-
mate behavior of the system. ([9], p. 117) 
In unstable systems and in systems near some singularity, M a x w e l l ' s "physi-
ca l " a x i o m is s imply false. M a x w e l l wants to undermine the common "prejudice 
i n favour of de terminism" ([27], p . 444), but he does not outr ight reject deter-
m i n i s m . It can be conceded that metaphys ica l de terminism is a doctrine which 
is not scientifically testable (because we never meet exactly the same i n i t i a l con-
di t ions twice) and perhaps is altogether useless for the advancement of science. 
Nevertheless, i t is a substant ial ph i losophica l doctrine for the meri ts and de-
merits of which i t is interesting to argue — on the basis of current scientific 
knowledge. 
M a x w e l l does not make a sustained effort at expl ica t ing the characteristics 
of the s tat is t ical me thod and its precise re la t ion to the h i s t o r i ca l / dynamica l 
method, nor does he argue i n support of a linkage between this fundamental 
d is t inc t ion and his emphasis on instabi l i t ies . 
B u t as already mentioned, I th ink that Poincare 's method of arbi t rary func-
t ions answers the questions surrounding M a x w e l l ' s diagnosis very generally and 
w i t h surprising effectiveness. His paradigmat ic example is an idealized roulette, 
i.e., a game of chance, but he suggests that the method has a much wider field of 
appl ica t ion. In connecting dynamic and s ta t is t ical reasoning i t is first impor tan t 
what to count as chance, or a "fortuitous phenomenon": 
A very small cause which escapes our notice determines a considerable effect 
that we cannot fail to see, and then we say that that effect is due to chance. 
. . . it may happen that small differences in the init ial conditions produce very 
great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former wil l produce an 
enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the 
fortuitous phenomenon. ([37], pp. 67-68) 
T h i s picture clearly reconciles L a p l a c i a n determinism w i t h the seemingly 
random result of the drawings of our u rn experiment . It must be stressed that 
25 The predicates "weak" and "strong" are slightly misleading, since the strong principle 
does not logically entail the weak one. 
Poincare does not at a l l renounce de t e rmin i sm. 2 6 He rather suggests a k ind of 
reducib i l i ty of chance to mechanist ic patterns, or more exactly, the resolution 
of the appearance of chance i n a determinist ic wor ld picture. 
W h y is this a solut ion of the problem posed by M a x w e l l and recently rein-
forced by Kr i ige r? W h a t has this achievement got to do wi th the question of 
whether i t is reasonable to talk of "constant causes"? T h e latter term is from 
the rea lm of the stat is t ical method . Poincare i n effect showed how a "struc-
tu ra l " (physical , abstract, non-probabi l is t ic) descript ion of the system under 
consideration (in our case, of the urn containing white and black balls) can "ex-
p la in" or "cause" the expected probabi l i ty dis t r ibut ions of the results of single, 
independent drawings. A s the explanat ion consists in the calcula t ion of trajec-
tories in the state space, causation is to be understood essentially i n terms of 
dynamical processes. T h e final step leading from probabil i t ies of single drawings 
to the constancy of s tat is t ical behaviour can then be taken w i t h the help of the 
mathemat ica l probabi l i ty calculus. It w i l l tell us that the colour rat io in the 
sequence of drawings w i l l very probably be approximately equal to the single 
case probabil i t ies . Not ice that i n accepting this as a causal explanat ion , we 
tac i t ly make use of a fifth concept of explanat ion based on the high probability 
of an imprecisely specified effect. T h i s concludes our ra t iona l reconstruction of 
Laplace 's doctr ine of constant causes. 
5 Essentials of Chaos Theory 
T h e at tent ion pa id by M a x w e l l to instabil i t ies and singularit ies is a s y m p t o m of 
the increased interest of physicists of the t ime in complex dynamica l sys tems. 2 7 
B y the end of the 19th century, i t was not only Poincare who contr ibuted to 
impor tan t progress in the field. Sofya Kovalevskaya ([16]) and Aleksandr L y a p u -
nov ([24]) wrote classic papers on the concept of s tabi l i ty in dynamica l systems, 
and Jacques Hadamard ([12]) proved a result which is made chief witness for 
the impact of unpredic tabi l i ty i n classical physics by D u h e m ([6], Chapte r 7) 
and Popper ([38], § 14). 
However, I do not th ink that the work of M a x w e l l , Poincare, and others 
ac tual ly contradicts the Lap l ac i an conception of the wor ld . There is only a 
change of emphasis. W h i l e Laplace may be understood as i m p l y i n g that stable 
26 This is very explicit in Poincare ([37], pp. 64-65, 70). A similar view is expressed by von 
Smohichowski ([47], p. 80). 
27 Maxwell may have been influenced by Barre de Saint-Venant (cf. [11], p. 464). Maxwell 
([27]) could be read as a proclamation of the programme of chaos theory, were it not for 
the fact that his principal concerns were the mass phenomena of the statistical theory of 
gases. However, he does refer to one very simple system exhibiting chaotic behaviour in 
Maxwell ([27], p. 442): the singularity in the refraction of light in a biaxial crystal. 
and predictable systems are the rule and instabil i t ies the exception, M a x w e l l 
and i n par t icular Poincare become aware that the t ru th is rather the other way 
round . It is the merit of chaos theory that this insight has gained widespread 
recognit ion today. 
M o d e r n chaos theory has a definite s tar t ing point . It began in 1963 w i t h 
the pub l ica t ion of E d w a r d Lorenz 's article on "Determinis t ic nonperiodic flow" 
in the Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 2 6 Since the '80s at least, chaos 
theory has been very fashionable and at tracted the interest of almost every 
scientific discipl ine. For our purposes a knowledge of chaos theory provided 
by good popular presentations such as Deker and T h o m a s ([5]), Crutchf ie ld et 
a l . ([4]), Jensen ([14]), or Gle ick ([9]) is sufficient. Some of the most essential 
characteristics of chaos theory are the fol lowing: 
• E v e n very simple determinist ic systems can exhibi t an incurably unpredic-
table behaviour, and this not only at a few isolated points of s ingular i ty but 
over a wide range of possible states. It does not help to gather more infor-
ma t ion about the i n i t i a l condit ions of such "chaotic" systems. A perfectly 
exact statement of the i n i t i a l condit ions cannot be obtained (uncertainty l i -
mi ta t ion) , and an analy t ica l solut ion of the equations involved is impossible 
(complexi ty l imi ta t ion) . Even the smallest errors introduced by incomplete 
knowledge or approximat ion techniques tend to have disastrous consequences 
for the ca lcula t ion of the further development of the system. 
• Very many real-life systems function as chance devices, by ampl i fy ing minute 
differences into extensive macroscopic effects. Iterative processes, l ike co l l i s i -
ons i n the m i x i n g of the balls i n our urn , lead to an exponent ia l ampli f icat ion 
of i n i t i a l differences. 
• T h e development of chaotic systems is extremely sensitive to the smallest 
changes of parameters or i n i t i a l condit ions; l ike causes do not have like effects. 
W h e n the development of i n d i v i d u a l cases (as opposed to mass phenomena) is 
considered, one must not assume that sma l l perturbat ions ("variable causes") 
cancel out in the long run. O n the contrary, they w i l l quite often b u i l d up 
to clearly perceptible effects. M a x w e l l ' s physical a x i o m is violated, and a 
fortiori Popper 's ([38], § 3) "pr inciple of accountabi l i ty" becomes a demand 
that cannot be met. 
• M a n y s t r ic t ly determinist ic systems exhibi t what appears to be perfectly 
r andom behav iour . 2 9 Thus de terminism and predictabi l i ty , which had so often 
been taken to mean the same th ing , get separated. It is only the latter 
28 In so far as he insists on the unpredictable behaviour of very simple deterministic systems, 
one could think of calling Max Born a forerunner of modern chaos theory. However, one 
should pay attention to the fact that while Born dissociates causality from determinism 
(cf. [1], p. 78) but not predictability from determinism, the upshot of chaos theory goes 
just the other way round: its concept of causality is reflected in deterministic difference 
or differential equations, but predictability is emphatically denied. 
which should be associated w i t h the concepts randomness and chance. As a 
consequence, there is no incompa t ib i l i t y between de te rmin ism and chance. 
• Chaos theory tells us that the geometric structure of equivalence regions 
in the sense specified above is extremely complex and interlaced, that i t 
exhibi ts self-similarities on every scale of magnif icat ion, in short: that it 
forms a fractal structure. 
• Recent high-powered computers make it possible to run fascinating s imula-
tions — al though these s imulat ions are just r id iculous sand-table games as 
compared to the complexi ty encountered in real life. 
The insights are not so new after a l l , jus t the emphasis is. A g a i n it seems 
to me that there is no contradict ion between the views of Laplace and the new 
chaos-theoretic ideology. T h e difference is one of interests: Whereas Laplace s t i l l 
struggled w i t h the impl ica t ions of Newton ian mechanics and confined himself to 
aspects of the orderliness of nature, Poincare and his followers had mathemat ica l 
means and vigour to attack a l l the complexit ies of chaos. Poincare actual ly 
worked on concrete chaotic systems in celestial mechanics (notably the three-
body problem) and the theory of turbulent fluids, wi thout at first caring to 
provide a general "philosophy" of chaos. B u t as we have seen, even before he 
made his renowned contr ibutions to concrete problems of dynamica l systems, i t 
was M a x w e l l who had indicated the way to go. 
W h a t does chaos theory contr ibute to the solut ion of our problem? I should 
like to argue that this strong theoretical movement, and the powerful computa-
t iona l resources now available, help us understand the importance and ub iqui ty 
of "chaotic" phenomena. It transforms the casual discussions of roulette examp-
les at the tu rn of the century into a respectable approach which is applicable to 
an enormous variety of real-life processes at every scale of magnif icat ion. 
Even i n apparently simple systems governed by s imple determinis t ic laws and 
a sma l l number of parameters, predic t ion is not possible over any reasonably long 
per iod. Equivalence regions leading to identical results do not form "natura l" 
classes of points in the state space. T h e objective s imi la r i ty relat ion — i n 
fact: equivalence relation — engendered by ident ical outcomes of apparently 
r andom processes, such as the drawings from an urn, does not correspond to any 
subjective s imi la r i ty relat ion among the i n i t i a l cond i t ions . 3 0 T h i s does, however, 
by no means preclude the possibi l i ty of ex post facto explanat ions once the event 
in question has happened. 3 1 
29 It is important that this kind of randomness, although measurable in terms of probabi-
lities, is not a measure of ignorance. "The randomness is fundamental; gathering more 
information does not make it go away." ([4], p. 38). The same point is made by Prigogine 
and Stengers ([39], p. 263). Absolute precision — the fixation of absolutely correct values 
of the relevant parameters — would help, but it is unattainable. 
30 This moral may in many cases be transferred into the social sciences and the humanities. 
Cf. Poincare's ([37], pp. 86-87) insightful remark on historiography. 
6 Conclusion: What About Probabilism in a Deter-
ministic Framework? 
Is there a fundamental role played by probabi l i t ies in scientific explanat ion w i -
th in the framework of classical physics? D o we really overthrow the t rad i t iona l 
tenet that p robab i l i ty i n classical physics just mirrors the degree of our igno-
rance? 
Before t ry ing to answer these questions, let us consider the fol lowing quota-
t i o n : 3 2 
probability considerations and causal determination are complementary; the 
former are only admissible where the latter has not (yet) succeeded. Lawlike 
connections must be absent or destroyed, e.g., by mixing the cards or shaking 
the die, in order to make room for valid applications of probability theory. Fries 
appears to have seen that statistical regularities, far from being explainable in 
terms of causes, are not even compatible with the possibility of a complete 
regulation of the relevant events by determining laws. ([18], p . 68) 
Contras t this w i t h Poincare 's ([37], pp. 66-67) remarks on life insurance 
companies and indiscreet doctors, and von Smoluchowksi ' s ([47], p. 82) remarks 
on the kinet ic theory of gases. Aga ins t Laplace , these authors argue that j u d -
gements of p robabi l i ty may remain va l id even after our ignorance is removed. 
Le t us see how Poincare construes the l i nk between determinist ic causali ty and 
the concept of chance: 
. . . then we say that this event is due to chance, and so the word has the same 
sense as in the physical sciences; it means that small causes have produced 
great effects. ([37], p. 87) 
or M a r i a n von S m o l u c h o w s k i 3 3 : 
Man nennt Zufall eine spezielle A r t von Kausalrelationen. Man sagt namlich 
gewohnlich, daft ein Ereignis y vom Zufall abhangt, wenn es eine solche Funk-
tion einer veranderlichen (eventl. auch ihrem Werte nach unbekannten oder 
absichtlich ignorierten) Ursache oder Teilbedingung x ist, dafi sein Eintreten 
oder Nichteintreten von einer sehr kleinen Anderung des x abhangt . . . ([47], 
p. 86) 
31 This opens, I believe, an interesting perspective on much-debated issues in the theory 
of scientific explanation, e.g., Scriven's syphilitic (see [52], pp. 215-216, 978-982) and 
Rosen's golfer (see [53], pp. 159-160). 
32 Kriiger refers to the following passage of Jakob Friedrich Fries ([7], p. 3): "Diese ganze 
Berechnungsweise der subjectiven mittleren Wahrscheinlichkeit a posteriori [by the law 
of large numbers, HR] hat immer die Voraussetzung im Hintergrunde, dass in ihrem 
Bereiche keine nothwendigen Naturgesetze gelten, sondern immer noch moglicherweise 
ein Spielraum fur den Wechsel unbekannter gleich moglicher Falle bleibe." 
Poincare and von Smoluchowski , and our above discussion, seem to indicate 
that Kr i ige r ' s posi t ion i n the quoted passage is untenable. S t i l l our objecti-
v iza t ion program for final probabil i t ies seems insufficient. Some philosophers 
might insist that the i n i t i a l probabi l i t ies should have an objective meaning. 
One solut ion is provided by results of ergodic theory. ([2]; cf. [34]) 
Under some quite moderate conditions characterizing a chaotic dynamical 
system, the time-average of the system's being in a particular state is in 
the long run the same for almost every conceivable initial condition. 
T h i s is a mathemat ica l result, but is i t really a solut ion of our problem? 
Fi rs t question: Is it legitimate, i n the context of our p rob lem, to identify these 
time-averages (which follow from the physical specification of the chaotic dyna-
m i c a l system) w i t h the probabi l i t ies over the set of conceivable i n i t i a l states? 
V o n P l a t o seems to suggest that the answer is 'yes.' For this reason, he claims, 
ergodic theory is successful i n replacing subjective probabil i tes (as under ly ing 
the ensemble approach of G ibbs ) by objective probabil i t ies (specified by Bo l t z -
mann 's time-average approach). Unfortunately, I do not see the rationale of 
that replacement — apart f rom the fact that it avoids subject ivi ty. 
B u t then there is also a second question: Should we try to get r i d of the 
subjective probabil i tes over the in i t i a l condit ions? I th ink the answer is 'no . ' 
O u r ideas of s imi la r i ty and normal i ty are i r reducibly subjective, and we can 
wi thout any reluctance base our expectations about the outcomes on subjective 
probabi l i t ies . T h e reason is quite direct ly given by Poincare and spelled out i n 
our reasoning above: In chance-producing determinist ic systems, it s imply does 
not matter on which i n i t i a l d i s t r ibu t ion we base our calculat ions, as long as this 
d i s t r ibu t ion is reasonably smooth ("practically continuous", [37], pp. 82—8334 ). 
T h a n k s to chaos, v i r tua l ly a l l differences of in i t i a l state dis t r ibut ions equal out 
in the long run . 
W h a t I take to be the m a i n lesson from Poincare 's proof and a l l its later 
refinements is this: 
In games of chance, but also in a great variety of less ar t i f icial applicat ions, 
an extreme sensitivity of effects to changes of initial conditions (i.e., of the 
causes) entails an extreme insensitivity of the probability distribution of 
33 C o m p a r e Laplace ([19], p. xlvii): " A u mil ieu des causes variables et inconnues que nous 
comprenons sous le n o m de hasard, . . . " St i l l thirty years earlier, it was K a n t who very 
strictly t ied his notion of "Zufall" to causality: "Dafl gleichwohl der Satz: alles Zufallige 
miisse eine Ursache haben, doch jedermann aus blofien BegrifTen klar einleuchte, ist nicht 
zu leugnen" ([15], B 289-290). Whi l s t we are at pains to argue that even what appears to 
happen by chance may have purely deterministic causes, for K a n t the l ink between " Z u -
fall" and causal determination is analytic! Kant ' s "Zufall", however, must be translated 
by "contingency" or "conditionality" rather than by "chance" or "'randomness". 
34 T h a t it is a non-mathematical sense of continuity which is required was already pointed 
out by von Kries ([17], p. 51, footnote 1). 
effects to the probability distributions of initial conditions (of the causes). 
Those readers who would l ike to see the relevance of this paper to "causal 
logic" — which is the unifying topic of the present volume — may cal l this 
pr inc ip le leading from ind iv idua l chaos to collective order a pr inciple of the 
probabilistic logic of deterministic causality. 
Las t but by no means least, how can this lesson be brought to bear in the 
socia l sciences? I do not have anyth ing like a conclusive answer. O n the face 
of i t , i t does not seem too implausible to suggest that many of our decisions 
are influenced by so many contingencies that they have the appearance of ran-
d o m behaviour. M i n u t e differences i n some inconspicuous boundary condit ions 
might well have effected enormous differences for the rest of your l i f e . 3 5 However, 
s tat is t ic ians once and again observe amazing constancies across large popu la t i -
ons. If this is due to some well-behaved d i s t r ibu t ion of i n i t i a l condit ions, aren't 
we back then to the question of how the d i s t r ibu t ion of i n i t i a l condit ions should 
be explained? C a n the patterns of such an explanat ion be the same as those 
encountered i n games of chance? 
T h e purpose of this paper has been to point out the compat ib i l i ty of me-
taphysical de te rmin ism wi th a fundamental role of probabil i t ies i n scientific 
accounts of causation and explanat ion. I have advanced no arguments in favour 
of de terminism, but I have tr ied to block a possible argument against determi-
n i sm from a probabi l is t ic wor ld view. There is a bridge between the dynamical 
or historical account of causation (which seems to be about single cases or "to-
kens") and the concept of causation as understood in statistics (which seems 
to be about collections or "types"). L i k e many writers, I have emphasized the 
crucia l role played by the fact that in most systems of interest, we confront 
a complex interact ion of mul t ip le causal factors and an extreme sensit ivi ty to 
smal l variat ions of i n i t i a l condit ions. 
W e have to be aware, though, that there is a basic phi losophical p rob lem 
which remains unsolved. W h a t do the smooth probabi l i ty dis t r ibut ions over 
in i t i a l condit ions really mean, and where do they come from? Poincare, the 
inventor of the method of arbi t rary functions and the precursor of modern chaos 
theory , 3 6 d id not find a satisfactory answer. In Science and Hypothesis ([36], pp. 
192, 195, 200, 210) he invokes the pr inciple of sufficient reason, an aprioris t ic 
idea which is not even well-defined (see section 3). In Science and Method ([37], 
pp. 83, 85) he appeals to the his tor ical tendency of the wor ld towards smoother 
and smoother p robabi l i ty dis t r ibut ions, and thus invites the question at which 
point in history the development of the probabil i t ies should be taken to start. 
In the present paper I have advocated a subjective interpretat ion of i n i t i a l 
35 Remember how you came to know your partner in life. 
36 It is amazing that the literature on Poincare does not establish a connection between 
these two achievements of his. — Also recall footnote 1. 
single case probabi l i t ies which is to reflect not uncertainty, but a combined mea-
sure of similarity-to-the-actual-state-of-affairs and normal i ty . T h i s makes the 
object ivi ty that was gained in the course of our argument just an intersubjec-
tive agreement, and falls short of something objective in the sense presupposed 
by na tura l scientists. B u t I do not see how a workable objective interpretat ion 
could be obtained. We cannot s imply count relative frequencies i n order to find 
the i n i t i a l probabil i t ies , because empi r ica l frequencies are just the things we 
set out to expla in , and we would find ourselves t rapped in an infinite regress. 
We cannot employ l imi t s of t ime averages of sojourn, even when they exist 
and are unique, because there is no just i f icat ion for t ak ing these single-system 
probabil i t ies to be probabil i t ies of i n i t i a l states. F ina l l y , it seems to me that 
a propensity interpretat ion of probabi l i t ies does not help us either, since i t is 
hard to understand and seems incompat ib le w i t h the dynamic point of view we 
wanted to rescue. 3 7 Mos t l ikely quan tum theory w i l l have the last word i n the 
interpretat ion of probabi l i ty . B u t even i n the more h u m d r u m domain of classical 
Newtonian—or Laplac ian—physics , not to speak of the domain of psychological 
and social phenomena, there are deep riddles left for the philosopher 's acumen. 
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